Central theory Johann Gottlieb Fichte

in work foundations of natural right (1797), fichte argued self-consciousness social phenomenon — important step , perhaps first clear step taken in direction modern philosophy. necessary condition of every subject s self-awareness, fichte, existence of other rational subjects. these others call or summon (fordern auf) subject or self out of unconsciousness , awareness of free individual.

fichte s account proceeds general principle must set individual in order set @ all, , in order set individual must recognize calling or summons (aufforderung) other free individual(s) — called, moreover, limit own freedom out of respect freedom of other. same condition applied , applies, of course, other(s) in development. hence, mutual recognition (gegenseitig anerkennen) of rational individuals turns out condition necessary individual in general. argument intersubjectivity central conception of selfhood developed in foundations of science of knowledge (grundlage der gesamten wissenschaftslehre, 1794/1795). in fichte s view consciousness of self depends upon resistance or check understood not part of self yet not ascribable particular sensory perception. in later 1796–1799 lectures (his nova methodo), fichte incorporated revised presentation of foundations of system, summons takes place alongside original feeling, takes place of earlier anstoss (see below) both limit upon absolute freedom of , condition positing of same.

the (das ich) sets situation (it posits itself). set (setzen) not mean create objects of consciousness. principle in question states essence of lies in assertion of 1 s own self-identity, i.e., consciousness presupposes self-consciousness. such immediate self-identity, however, cannot understood psychological fact, nor act or accident of existing substance or being. action of i, 1 identical existence of same i. in fichte s technical terminology, original unity of self-consciousness understood both action , product of same i, fact and/or act (thathandlung; modern german: tathandlung), unity presupposed , contained within every fact , every act of empirical consciousness, although never appears such therein.

the must posit (setzen) in order @ all; can posit insofar posits (sets up) limited. moreover, cannot posit own limitations, in sense of producing or creating these limits. finite cannot ground of own passivity. instead, fichte, if posit off @ all, must discover limited, discovery fichte characterizes impulse, repulse, or resistance (anstoss; modern german: anstoß) free practical activity of i. such original limitation of is, however, limit insofar posits out limit. this, according fichte s analysis, positing own limitation, first, feeling, sensation, intuition of thing, , summons of person. anstoss provides essential impetus first posits in motion entire complex train of activities result in our conscious experience both of ourselves , others empirical individuals , of world around us.

though anstoss plays similar role thing in in kantian philosophy, unlike kant, fichte s anstoss not foreign i. instead, denotes s original encounter own finitude. rather claim not-i cause or ground of anstoss, fichte argues non-i set precisely in order explain anstoss, is, in order become conscious of anstoss.

though wissenschaftslehre demonstrates such anstoss must occur if self-consciousness come about, quite unable deduce or explain actual occurrence of such anstoss — except condition possibility of consciousness. accordingly, there strict limits can expected priori deduction of experience, , limitation, fichte, equally applies kant s transcendental philosophy.

according fichte, transcendental philosophy can explain world must have space, time, , causality, can never explain why objects have particular sensible properties happen have or why determinate individual rather another. has discover @ same time discovers own freedom, , indeed, condition latter.

dieter henrich (1966) proposed fichte able move beyond reflective theory of consciousness . according fichte self must have prior acquaintance itself, independent of act of reflection ( no object comes consciousness except under condition aware of myself, conscious subject [jedes object kommt zum bewusstseyn lediglich unter der bedingung, dass ich auch meiner selbst, des bewusstseyenden subjects mir bewusst sey] . idea henrich called fichte s original insight.